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The role of media in any society is determined by the level of press freedom in that society. 
Freedom of the press can be best seen in the relationship between the government and mass 
media institutions. Since the end of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the Cuban regime has been 
criticized by organizations all over the world for allegedly limiting press freedom in the island. 
Despite the wide controversy, little is known about the state of freedom of the press in Cuban 
media in the last few years. This study set out to investigate the level of press freedom enjoyed in 
Cuba from the year 2002 to 2013 as well as any changes in policy in regards to this freedom in 
the same timeline. Through interviews with Cuban exiles living in the United States, it was 
concluded that there is a very limited amount of press freedom granted to mass media 
institutions. Additionally, it was concluded that no fundamental changes have been made to grant 
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Introduction 
 Media play a vital role in our society by disseminating information to help citizens form 
public opinions about issues that are deemed important to their lives.   Freedom of the press is 
therefore a fundamental element in any democratic society that allows citizens to access 
information about their government, to scrutinize their roles and policies, and to hold 
government officials accountable for their actions.  In other words, the level of press freedom in 
a society helps define the functions of mass media in that society.  Freedom of the press can be 
understood by observing the relationship between the government and media institutions.  While 
mass media in a democratic society such as the United States enjoy a high level of press 
freedom, mass media in a non-democratic society such as Cuba do not.  Despite the close 
proximity of Cuba and the United States and a large Cuban population currently living in the 
United States, we know very little about the present state of Cuban media.  No studies have taken 
place to shed light on the level of freedom of Cuban journalists in recent years amidst the 
increasing influence of the Internet and social media use; and there has been a lack of literature 
on this subject in the United States in the last decade.   
This study sets out to investigate the level of freedom of the press in Cuba from the year 
2002 to 2013.   It aims to determine the level of freedom of the press in Cuba and any changes in 
Cuban policy regarding the exercise of this freedom.  Through an extensive literature review and 
interviews of Cuban exiled journalists, writers and dissidents in the United States, the researcher 
seeks to create a baseline for future research on the subject.  Finally, the Cuban media are 
discussed using the Four Theories of the Press (Schramm, Sibert, & Peterson, 1956) to help us 
gain insight into the rationale for the use of mass media by the Cuban government. 
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Literature Review 
Historical background- Post revolutionary Cuba 
The Cuban Revolutionary movement began in July 1953, led by revolutionary socialist 
leader Fidel Castro, who later took power from former Cuban Prime Minister, General Fulgencio 
Batista in January 1959. Fidel Castro came into power promising a democratic government 
opposite to Batista’s dictatorship. At the beginning of Fidel Castro’s rule, most Cubans saw 
Castro and his allies as heroes and praised the new government policy for liberating them from 
the repressive regime of Batista. However, soon after, he began to receive criticism not only 
from Cuban citizens but also from other countries for allegedly violating human rights and for 
not adopting a democratic type of government as promised but rather a socialist type of 
government. Human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Freedom House, 
which monitor press freedom worldwide, suggest that freedom of the press, have and still are 
denied to the people of Cuba1. Additionally, there are numerous testimonies and letters from 
exiles, political prisoners, and independent journalists talking about repression in the island 
(Amnesty International, 2012; Cavanaugh, 1997; Cragg, 2003; Fainstein, 1996; Hilton, 2003; 
Penton 2010).  
Raul Castro, Fidel Castro’s younger brother, officially took power in 2008 due to Fidel 
Castro’s worsening health condition. Like his older brother, now President Raul Castro has 
received criticism for allegedly continuing to legally pursue any Cuban citizens who are publicly 
critical of the administration and of the government’s public policies (Amnesty International, 
                                                          
1
 See Amnesty International, 2012; Annual Report on Cuba 2013, 2014; Annual Report on Cuba 2012, 
2013; Annual Report on Cuba 2011, 2012; Annual Report on Cuba 2010, 2011; Annual Report on Cuba 
2009, 2010; Annual Report on Cuba 2008, 2009; Annual Report on Cuba 2007, 2008; Freedom House, 
2002; Freedom House, 2003; Freedom House, 2004; Freedom House, 2005; Freedom House, 2006; 
Freedom House, 2007; Freedom House, 2008; Freedom House, 2009; Freedom House, 2010; Freedom 
House, 2011; Freedom House, 2012; Freedom House, 2013. 
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2012; Latell, 2007; Wilkinson, 2010). On the other hand, he has also received recognition for 
allowing greater freedom of speech. For example, he has encouraged more debate and criticism 
in society and released imprisoned human rights activists (McKinley, 2008). 
According to Nicola Miller, a professor of Latin American History at the University 
College London in the United Kingdom, the Cuban journalism system is at the service of the 
state (2008,). During an interview with Lee Lockwood in 1965, former President Fidel Castro 
talked about freedom of the press. Fidel Castro said: 
An enemy of Socialism cannot write in our newspapers- but we don’t deny it, and we 
don’t go around proclaiming a hypothetical freedom of the press where it actually doesn’t 
exist…. Furthermore, I admit that our press is deficient in this respect…. Not that I would 
tell you we delude ourselves that under the present circumstances journalism can have 
any other function more important than that of contributing to the political and 
revolutionary goals of our country. We have… an objective to fulfill, and that objective 
essentially controls the activity of the journalists (Morgan, 1975, p. 13).  
 
In response to Fidel Castro’s statement, Lent (1985) argues that the main objective of the Cuban 
media is to communicate and reinforce government policies and objectives as well as official 
positions.  
 
The Press in Cuba 
 Currently, there are 22 official newspapers in Cuba (Medios de comunicacion- 
Periodicos, 2014), 7 official news agencies (Medios de comunicacion- Periodicos- Agencias de 
prensa, 2014), 33 official radio stations (Medios de comunicacion- Radio, 2014), 22 official 
television networks (Medios de comunicacion- TV, 2014), 16 official magazines (Medios de 
comunicacion- Revistas, 2014), and 3 internet portals (Medios de comunicacion- Portales, 2014). 
These media outlets cover a wide range of topics; for example, the newspaper Juventud Rebelde 
(Rebellious Youth) is completely dedicated to topics of interest to the youth, the newspaper 
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Trabajadores (Workers) is dedicated to the working population, the news agency Prensa Latina 
(Latino Press) disseminates breaking news mainly in Cuba and Latin America, Radio Coco is the 
informative and sports radio station, TV Serrana reflects and defends the human rights and the 
culture of the people of Sierra Maestra (a mountainous area in Cuba from where Fidel Castro 
launched the revolution), and the magazine Mujeres is dedicated to women issues (“Medios de 
comunicación”, 2014). All official news agencies are owned and controlled by the government.  
Despite their wide coverage, the current number of all media in Cuba is smaller relative 
to the amount of media outlets existent before Fidel Castro came into power in 1959. During 
Batista’s years, the mass media was admittedly corrupt and independently owned (Lent, 1985). 
During Batista’s presidency, muckraking editorial writers were suppressed by bribes from the 
government. If they decided to publish an unwanted article they would simply deny the bribe 
without facing criminal charges (Morgan, 1975). When Castro took power in 1959, media was 
affected by the shift in ideology and philosophy of the Revolution. Mass media became owned 
and controlled by the government and must follow and encourage socialist ideas in accordance to 
government policies (Lent, 1995).  
On several occasions, Fidel Castro has expressed his belief that the press and the media 
belong to the people and that the only way to keep mass media safe is to be government owned. 
He feels that giving the press more freedom would create more problems; therefore, he doesn’t 
allow any comments against the government. He claims that he’s only looking out for the best 
interest of Cuban society (Fairley, 2010).  
Before the revolution, there were between 60 and 70 newspapers in the island. When 
Castro took power in 1959 he exposed corrupt journalists, seized five dailies, and took over two 
of the main dailies he had seized, Alerta (which he renamed Revolución) and Hoy.  Some 
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independent newspapers remained open. However, these independent newspapers closed up due 
to a resolution passed by the Journalist’s Association which was established in 1963. The 
resolution allowed public comments on the articles published which were required to be 
publicized. Many people sent comments discrediting the papers. Some papers refused to publish 
these comments and as a result, were seized by the government (Morgan, 1975). 
In October of 1965 Fidel Castro merged the two seized newspapers, Revolución and Hoy, 
into one (Morgan, 1975) and named it Granma after the name of the yacht in which he traveled 
from Mexico to Cuba with Che Gevara to complete his plan of revolution in 1953 (Lent, 1985). 
Granma is the largest and most important national daily newspaper in Cuba. It is the essential 
organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and it has a circulation of about 
700,000 (Medios de comunicacion- Periodicos, 2014; Miyares, 1999). Additionally, it can be 
accessed online in six different languages (Digital Granma Internacional, 2014). According to 
official Cuban sources, the daily newspaper talks about current events in Cuba and the world 
(Medios de comunicacion- Periodicos, 2014). The daily has been criticized for having a political 
agenda which praises the Soviet Union, supports Latin American guerrilla movements and builds 
hate towards the United States (Morgan, 1975) which are tasks assigned and encouraged by the 
government (Primer Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba: Tesis y Resoluciones- Sobre los 
medios de diffusion masiva, 1975).  
According to Ted Morgan, a veteran journalist who studied the press in Cuba, “The 
papers reinforce rather than comment upon Cuban policy” (1975, p. 16). Like Morgan (1975), 
Rodriguez (2009) a journalism professor at the University of Habana, suggests that the Cuban 
media are persuasive and propagandistic rather than conversational and analytic. Morgan’s and 
Rodriguez’s suggestions are challenged by the Cuban government which claims that public 
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debate is encouraged (Miyares, 1999).  Recently, in 2006, Raul Castro encouraged Havana 
University students to fearlessly express themselves on the failures of revolution. He encouraged 
open debate and a willingness to listen to government criticism and concerns directly from the 
students (Roig-Franzia, 2006; Snow, 2006).  
During the most recent Congress of the Communist Party in 2011, it was stated that the 
press should encourage debate and public opinion. In the congress’ central report it was stated 
that 
En este frente se requiere también dejar atrás, definitivamente, el hábito del triunfalismo, 
la estridencia y el formalismo al abordar la actualidad nacional y generar materiales 
escritos y programas de televisión y radio, que por su contenido y estilo capturen la 
atención y estimulen el debate en la opinión pública. (Informe central al VI Congreso del 
Partido Comunista, 2011, p. 23) 
 
[Translation] In this area of work [media] it is also necessary to definitely banish the 
habit of describing the national reality in pretentious high-flown language or with 
excessive formality. Instead, written materials and television and radio programs should 
be produced that catch the attention of the audience with their content and style while 
encouraging public debate. (Central Report to the 6th Congress of the Communist Party 
of Cuba, 2011, para. 73) 
 
During this congress, the government also recognized that the Cuban press disseminates boring, 
improvised and superficial reports due to a lack of timely access to information and a lack of 
access to the cadres or experts on the issues in question. They recognized this as an issue but did 
not mention a need or a plan for change. They also re-enforced the fact that the mass media 
needs to contribute to the promotion of national culture and to the revival of civic values in 
society (“Informe central al VI Congreso del Partido Comunista”, 2011, p. 23). During the Fifth 
Congress of the Communist Party in 1997, it was acknowledged that the Cuban media 
disseminates information to educate the population on current issues as well as on international 
issues (Castro, 1997). 
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Policies on Cuban Media: Purposes and Parameters 
 A series of laws and rules have been passed to establish the purpose and parameters of 
the media in Cuba. In 1971 the Cuban National Congress on Education and Culture said that 
radio, television, cinema, and the press are the key instruments to create ideologies and collective 
conscience; therefore, they need to be controlled (Lent, 1985). Later in 1975, the First Congress 
of the Cuban Communist Party stated that mass media is responsible for the political and 
ideological education of the masses. They stated that one of the main goals of the mass media 
must be to promote the revolution (Primer Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba: Tesis y 
Resoluciones- Sobre los medios de difusión masiva, 1975). The resolution states  
Al responder a los intereses del pueblo trabajador, la prensa escrita, la radio, la televisión 
y el cine asumieron progresivamente, como instituciones revolucionarias, una función 
social cualitativamente nueva, identificada y comprometida con el empeño de hacer 
avanzar, defender y consolidar nuestra Revolución. (Primer Congreso del Partido 
Comunista de Cuba: Tesis y Resoluciones- Sobre los medios de difusión masiva, 1975, 
p.1) 
 
[Translation] In response to the interests of the working people, the written press, the 
radio, the television, and the cinema, as revolutionary institutions, assumed the new 
social task of advancing, defending and consolidating our Revolution.  
 
In the most resent Cuban Constitution revised in 2002, Article 53 states  
Se reconoce a los ciudadanos libertad de palabra y prensa conforme a los fines de la 
sociedad socialista. Las condiciones materiales para su ejercicio están dadas por el hecho 
de que la prensa, la radio, la televisión, el cine y otros medios de difusión masiva son de 
propiedad estatal o social y no pueden ser objeto, en ningún caso, de propiedad privada, 
lo que asegura su uso al servicio exclusivo del pueblo trabajador y del interés de la 
sociedad. La ley regula el ejercicio de estas libertades. (Constitución de la República de 
Cuba, 2002) 
 
[Translation] Citizens have freedom of speech and of the press in keeping with the 
objectives of socialist society. Material conditions for the exercise of that right are 
provided by the fact that the press, radio, television, cinema, and other mass media are 
state or social property and can never be private property. This assures their use at 
exclusive service of the working people and in the interests of society. The law regulates 
the exercise of those freedoms.  
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Through this legislation, the mass media are owned and controlled by the government for the 
benefit of society and they can never be privately owned. Journalists are encouraged to be 
devoted to the development of a “truly revolutionary and socialist style in the use of the various 
forms and techniques of expression” (Lent, 1985, p. 610). At the 1982 Union of Writers and 
Artists of Cuba (UNEAC), Culture Minister Armando Hart Davolos, said that “artistic creativity 
is free as long as its content is not contrary to the Revolution” (p. 610). Fidel Castro re-enforces 
this idea (Kronenberg, 2011). Artistic expression is also mentioned in the Cuban Constitution 
article 39 item CH which states that “there is freedom of artistic creation as long as its content is 
not contrary to the Revolution” (Constitución de la República de Cuba, 2002).  
 The Fifth Congress of the Communist Party stated that the mass media and its 
organizations have a vital role in the ideological struggle to strengthen the revolution and have 
the duty to inform on the current events in Cuba and the rest of the world (V Congreso del 
Partido Comunista de Cuba: El partido de la unidad, la democracia, y los derechos humanos que 
defendemos, 1977). The Sixth Congress of the Communist Party emphasized the fact that the 
mass media need to contribute to the promotion of national culture and to the revival of civic 
values in society (“Informe central al VI Congreso del Partido Comunista”, 2011, p. 23).  
 The Union of Cuban Journalists (UPEC) is a social and professional nongovernmental 
organization (still registered with the Cuban Ministry of Justice) created in 1963 with the 
purpose of uniting journalists previously divided among different associations. Previous media 
associations included Colegio Nacional de Periodistas, Asociación de la Prensa de Cuba, 
Asociación de Reporteros de la Habana, and many more smaller organizations made up of 
journalists, photographers, camarographers, cartoonists, etcetera (Perfil de la UPEC, 2013). 
According to Article 9, item a, of the UPEC statutes approved in 2013, it is the organization’s 
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goal to defend journalists in the legal and ethical implementation of their profession. According 
to Article 9, item b, the organization also aims to contribute to the formation of journalists in 
traditional political ideology and patriotic principles (Estatutos de la UPEC, 2013). The UPEC is 
a member of various international organizations such as the Organization of Journalists (OPI), 
the Latin America Federation of Journalists (FELAP), and the Caribbean Media Workers 
Association (CAMWORK). They claim to aim to protect the practice of journalism, encourage 
technical and cultural education as well as social recognition for journalism (Miyares, 1999). The 
organization has received criticism for allegedly working for the benefit of the government and 
not for the benefit of journalists. In 2013, during the IX Congress of the Union of Cuban 
journalists, Diaz Canel, the first Vice President of the Council of State of Cuba, stated that the 
Cuban press stands firm on the revolution and aids the Castros in building the desired socialism 
(Nuestra prensa es fiel a la Revolución, a Fidel y Raúl, afirmó Miguel Díaz Canel, 2013).  
The Constitution states that rights and freedoms recognized by the government are only 
lawfully exercised if they do not go against the ideals of socialism and communism. Article 62 
states that 
Ninguna de las libertades reconocidas a los ciudadanos puede ser ejercida contra lo 
establecido en la Constitución y las leyes, ni contra la existencia y fines del Estado 
socialista, ni contra la decisión del pueblo cubano de construir el socialismo y el 
comunismo. La infracción de este principio es punible. (Constitución de la República de 
Cuba, 2002) 
 
[Translation] None of the freedoms which are recognized for citizens can be exercised 
contrary to what is established in the Constitution and by law, or contrary to the existence 
and objectives of the socialist state, or contrary to the decision of the Cuban people to 
build socialism and communism. Violations of this principle can be punished by law. 
 
Article 53 of the Cuban Constitution gives people freedom of expression and freedom of the 
press but based on article 62 of the Constitution, this freedom does not allow expression against 
socialism or the government. The freedom of speech and the press given by the Cuban 
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government has limitations. It does not allow people to express freely about their disagreements 
with the government or the revolution; and if they do, they can legally be punished. 
The Cuban Penal Code lays out the punishments for disrespecting the government in 
Article 144 items 1 and 2. In this Article the crime is called “desacato” (disrespect). The 
definition of “desacato” is very broad, therefore, dissidents are often convicted for this crime (de 
Leon, 1995). The crime of “desacato” is defined in Chapter II of the Cuban Penal Code, 
‘Violence, Disobedience and Causing Offence to Authorities, Public Functionaries and their 
Agents’, Under Section 3 Article 144 as: 
1. El que amenace, calumnie, difame, insulte, injurie o de cualquier modo ultraje u 
ofenda, de palabra o por escrito, en su dignidad o decoro a una autoridad, funcionario 
público, o a sus agentes o auxiliares, en ejercicio de sus funciones o en ocasión o con 
motivo de ellas, incurre en sanción de privación de libertad de tres meses a un año o 
multa de cien a trescientas cuotas o ambas. 
2. Si el hecho previsto en el apartado anterior se realiza respecto al Presidente del 
Consejo de Estado, al Presidente de la Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, a los 
miembros del Consejo de Estado o del Consejo de Ministros o a los Diputados a la 
Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, la sanción es de privación de libertad de uno a 
tres años. (Codigo Penal, 1999) 
 
[Translation] 
1. Whoever threatens, defames, maligns, injures, or in any way offends, orally or in 
writing, the dignity or propriety of any authority, public official, or any of their 
auxiliary agents, with regard to the exercise of their duties or in the execution of those 
same duties, shall be punished by loss of liberty for between three months and one 
year, or a fine of between 100 and 300 cuotas, or both. 
2. If the offense set out in the previous paragraph is committed against the President of 
the Council of Senate, the President of the National Assembly of Popular Power, or 
against the members of the Council of Ministers, or against Deputies to the National 
Assembly of Popular Power, the punishment shall be loss of liberty for between one 
and three years. 
 
These punishments are viewed as extremely unfair by many. The chair of the American Library 
Association international relations committee said that “You don’t throw people in the slammer 
for expressing ideas” (Gonzalez, 2005, p.1). Reporters who write against the regime may face 
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surveillance, interrogation, prison, or exile (Amnesty International, 2012; Orsi, 2012; Miller, 
2008; Wilkinson, 2010).  
 Finally, restrictions on travel were established by the government to those who oppose 
the government. The Immigration Law of 1976 required Cubans to ask the government for 
permission to leave the country. People who publicly disagree with the government also known 
as counter-revolutionaries were denied permits that would allow them to travel. Recently, in 
2012, and Immigration Reform was drafted and implemented in 2013. Decree Law 302, which 
modifies Immigration Law 1312 of 1976, states that Cubans no longer need government 
permission to leave the country. All they will be required to have is a valid passport and a visa 
(Decreto-Ley 302: Modificativo de la Ley 1312 “Ley de Inmigración” de 20 de Septiembre de 
1976, 2012) 
 
The Internet  
The Internet has become a way for people to connect and organize themselves. 
Governments that rely on centralized political control might face challenges as networks of 
dissidents, activists, and nongovernmental organizations come together through the web to 
pressure the regime for change (Boas, 2000; Mohr, 2007). Boas (2000), a junior fellow at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggests that in Cuba, even though Internet use 
has slowly increased over the past few years, the government has not been weakened by 
dissidents on the web. He believes this might be due to the fact that the government firmly 
controls the Internet.  
Miyares (1999) suggests that the U.S. hostility and defamation against Cuba, keeps 
freedom of the press limited in the island since the main role of journalists becomes to protect 
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Cuba’s image in the eyes of the world. Boas (2000) suggests that due to the United States’ threat 
to use the internet to destabilize the Cuban government, the Cuban regime has maintained and 
will continue to hold centralized control of the Internet to regulate and restrict its access 
especially against threats to communist ideology. Boas concludes that because of this political 
environment, the Internet has failed as a tool for reform since the development of the internet is 
not enough to encourage reform.  
Boas’ arguments are corroborated by recent data on Cubans’ internet access. According 
to Mohr (2007) and Monica (2012), very few people have access to the Internet in Cuba. College 
students and entrepreneurs are among the few groups of people that can enjoy Internet access 
under close government supervision. Only organizations and individuals who strongly favor the 
regime, like politicians, can enjoy unsupervised Internet access.  
Cyber cafes have been opened in the island, however, they have been criticized for being 
overpriced and almost impossible to afford by common citizens (Hildreth, 2001; Mohr, 2007; 
Wilkinson, 2010). Cuban activists face many obstacles when trying to disseminate information to 
educate and mobilize the population to challenge the regime (Mohr, 2007). The communist 
regime must grant people access to the Internet in order for political activists to use it as a means 
for change (Kalathil, 2003).  
In countries like China and Egypt, Internet use has significantly increased over the years. 
However, the increase of citizens in the web has led governments to control their access by 
censoring material from the internet. Similar to governments in China and Egypt that censor 
Internet material, it is hypothesized that the Cuban government will censor websites and other 
opposing information from the Internet as Internet use slowly increases in the island (Kalathil, 
2003).  
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Cuban Decree Law 209 talks about the access from the island to the World Wide Web. 
Articles 11 through 14 regulate Internet use to the benefit of national interests and specify that 
the Internet will have a selective use. Additionally, direct access to the Internet has to be 
approved by the government. All Internet providers must be registered in the National Ministry 
of Electronic Information for the Web. People seeking access to the Internet must submit 
applications and receive licenses. Furthermore, article 44 states that dissemination of messages 
through the Internet contrary to the social or moral interests of the country or that threaten the 
integrity or security of the nation must be reported (Decreto No. 209- Acceso desde la Republica 
de Cuba a redes informaticas de alcance global, 1996). According to Kalathil (2003), the 
government encourages Internet companies to monitor users.  
As previously stated, under Decree Law 209, government permission is required to set up 
a private connection to the Internet. Permission is rarely granted so the only public access 
available to citizens is at government run cybercafés and tourist hotels. Access through these 
mediums is extremely costly. According to Wilkinson (2010), the cost for an hour of Internet 
access is about five U.S. dollars. It is important to note that the average monthly wage in Cuba is 
about fifteen U.S. dollars (Wright, 2011; Wilkinson, 2010).  
In 2001, the government released data suggesting that only about 60,000 people out of 
the population of 11 million were allowed to have e-mail accounts, most of which were only 
allowed to send e-mails domestically (Mama sees you, 2001). Internet access is mainly provided 
to politicians, schools, and businesses (Boas, 2000; Hildreth, 2001; Mama sees you, 2001, Mohr, 
2007). Luis Morelos, IT director of the Institute of Scientific and Technology Information stated 
that this is due to the limited data capacity. According to him, Cuba only has 10 megabytes of 
internet access. Because of a lack of available means, the government has to prioritize who gets 
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Internet access (Hildreth, 2001). Despite economic and material limitations, the Cuban media 
have been encouraged to access the internet (Miyares, 1999). Currently there are 13 national 
media electronic editions including daily newspapers, magazines, and radio stations, 4 
international electronic editions, and 43 online regional periodicals, radio stations and television 
networks (Prensa Cubana en Internet, 2014).  
In 2000, the Cuban government launched a campaign called “The Battle of Ideas” aiming 
to preserve the country’s culture to better the life of its citizens despite the cultural invasion and 
hostility from other nations through the mass media. According to then President, Fidel Castro, 
the goal of this campaign is to encourage the emergence of ideas that can bring peace to the 
world and a solution to violence. This campaign has encouraged the development of universal 
computer literacy by training teachers and adding computer classes to school curriculums 
starting from preschool to higher education (Mendes & Marques, 2009). 
Cuban use of the Internet has also proven to bring many benefits to the island. For 
example, the Ministry of Public Health’s network InfoMed provides people with medical 
journals and pharmaceutical databases. Additionally, it sends out medical alerts via e-mail to 
doctors and hospitals (Boas, 2000; Kalathil, 2003). 
Boas (2000) suggests that Cuba uses the Internet as a way to portray the regime’s version 
of the situation in Cuba to the world. They see the Internet as an opportunity to show the world 
their reality. Additionally, they distribute government propaganda through the web within the 
nation to support the revolution (Boas, 2000; Hildreth, 2001; Mama sees you, 2001, Mohr, 
2007). During the 7th UPEC Congress in 1999, it was decided that information from the island in 
the Internet had to be strengthened (Rodriguez, 2009).  
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Blogs 
In 2005, through an agreement with the National Company of Cuban 
Telecommunications, 872 journalists associated with the Union of Cuban Journalists gained 
access to the Internet from their homes and with private computers. The government sought to 
increase Cuban presence in the Internet to contradict inaccurate representations of the Nation. 
This open access to the web facilitated the emergence of Cuban blogs (Rodriguez, 2009).  
Blogs have gained popularity in Cuba over the last few years. In 2005, encouraged by the 
Union of Cuban Journalists and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, blogs were 
highly used by professional journalists to increase publications on Cuban reality from within the 
nation. They saw this as an opportunity to defend the nation from distorted information in the 
Internet published from other countries. UPEC created a blogging system within its website’s 
server through which bloggers could post their blogs. In 2007, six bloggers joined the UPEC 
blogging site. Later on in 2009, Blogcip.cu (now Bloguea.cu) was created to increase the amount 
of readers. Bloggers discovered that blogs were a fast and independent way of publishing 
information that allowed them to interact with readers (Rodriguez, 2009).  Currently, there are 
308 bloggers registered with UPEC coming from 16 different provinces in Cuba. Bloggers use 
four different blog publishing services which are Blogia.com (Spanish blogging), Bloguea.cu 
(Blogs of Cuban Jornalists), Blogspot.com (Google owned), and Wordpress.com (Directorio de 
blogs de periodistas Cubanos, 2013).  
Journalists saw blogs as a medium to publish informative stories that would otherwise 
never be published. However, informative stories in blogs have the potential to lose its credibility 
since blogs are not held to the same objective standards of traditional media. Blogs therefore 
diminish objectivity and sometimes are highly opinionated. Additionally, the individuality and 
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personal perspectives in blogs are threatened by bloggers’ fear of stating anything that might be 
interpreted as contrary to the Revolution. Traditional media institutions have the duty of revising 
blog content to ensure that if politically sensitive material is mentioned, the blogger defends the 
principles of Revolution (Rodriguez, 2009). 
 
Independent Journalists and Bloggers  
Journalists and bloggers who are not registered with government controlled media 
institutions face many challenges (Amnesty International, 2012; Miller, 2008). Lizabel Monica 
(2012) is an artist and writer who runs a digital magazine and a blog. She describes the 
difficulties of utilizing the Internet to disseminate information and explains and underground 
exchange of unofficial information. She explains that media, including her magazine, which is 
not registered with an official institution is illegal and cannot be presented in any public space. 
Therefore, independent journalists burn their content onto CDs and distribute them through 
human networks. To disseminate their blogs on the web, bloggers write their blogs on home 
computers without internet access, then save them on flash drives and give them to friends with 
Internet access such as hotel employees or employees of government offices (Wilkinson, 2010.) 
Other types of media, like the telephone, facilitate the flow of reports from independent 
journalists within the country. Since they are not allowed to publish in Cuba, these journalists 
call relatives or colleagues abroad to dictate their reports and get their information out there 
(Boas, 2000; Wilkinson, 2010).    
 Independent journalists and bloggers who are able to disseminate their material on the 
World Wide Web go through extraordinary measures (Radio Marti covers Cuba’s first ever 
blogging competition, 2009; Monica, 2012; Wilkinson, 2010). According to Wilkinson (2010), 
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“There are more than one hundred unauthorized bloggers in Cuba, including at least two dozen 
who are openly critical of the government” (para. 2). These type of bloggers and journalists face 
harassment, police surveillance, loss of employment, and have just recently been allowed to 
travel (Orsi, 2012; Wilkinson, 2010).  
 Yoani Sanchez is the most well-known Cuban independent journalist and blogger openly 
critical of the Revolution. She runs a blog called “Generation Y” which is translated in 17 
different languages (Generacion Y, 2014). On several occasions, she has been arrested, harassed 
and highly criticized for her opposition to the revolution (Orsi, 2012; Wilkinson, 2012). 
According to Sanchez, her blog talks about the reality in Cuba. She has gained popularity 
worldwide and admits that her popularity is mainly due to U.S. press coverage. Sanchez has 
received numerous journalism awards from the United States and Europe and was recognized in 
2008 by TIME magazine as one of the top one hundred influential people (Wilkinson, 2012). 
Due to the immigration reform in 2013, Sanchez has been able to travel the world giving 
speeches about Cuba to politicians in North America, Latin America, and Europe (Haven & Orsi, 
2013). Cubans critical of Yoani Sanchez and her work claim that she is working hand in hand 
with the U.S. government to undermine the Cuban government. Cuban websites that support the 
Cuban government like Cuba Debate, consider her an ignorant of Cuban history, a compulsive 
liar, and a despiser of the Cuban nation (¿Quién es Yoani Sánchez?, 2012; Wilkinson, 2010). 
 A study done by Stuart Allan (2006) indicates that blogging has the potential to change 
public debate. Blogs are a highly influential tool with the potential to transcend the traditional 
role of news (Cokley, 2009). Independent journalists in Cuba are trying to do just that.  
 Critics of independent journalists suggest that they only publish negative stories about 
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Cuba which include lies and defamations about the Cuban government encouraging the Cuban 
people to undermine the regime (Miyares, 1999).  
 
Cuban Government’s Response to Criticism  
During the Fifth Congress of The Cuban Communist Party, Fidel Castro stated that the 
Cuban enemies hold great power through their mass media and campaigns to keep the 
Revolution from influencing the people and to continue establishing their dominion. Castro 
stated that other countries portray a false picture of Cuba which is very different from what it 
really is (1997). During that same congress, the Unites States media were criticized for their 
manipulative qualities.  
La gran prensa, las agencias de noticias, la radio, el cine y especialmente la televisión y 
otros medios cada vez más sofisticados de comunicación, forman gigantescos sistemas 
monopólicos con los cuales manipulan la mente del hombre y fabrican la opinión pública. 
(V Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba: El partido de la unidad, la democracia, y 
los derechos humanos que defendemos, 1997, p. 28).  
 
[Translation] The big press, the news agencies, the radio, the cinema, and especially the 
television and other more sophisticated communication mediums, create gigantic 
monopolist systems with which they manipulate the minds of people and formulate 
public opinion.  
 
The United States has been described by the Cuban government as the “Trojan horse” aiming to 
weaken the Cuban Revolution from within the island. This belief is backed up by a series of 
actions taken by the United States towards Cuba (Landau, 2008). Such actions include the 1996 
Helms-Burton (Liberatd) Act. This Act provides organizations that strongly oppose the Cuban 
government and stand on U.S. policy with grants to support the encouragement of democracy in 
Cuba (Boas, 2000) and also prevent foreign investment in Cuba by denying entrance to the U.S. 
to anyone who does business in Cuba (Mendes & Marques, 2009; Wright, 2011). In response, in 
1999 the Cuban government passed Law 88 for the “Protection of National Independence and the 
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Economy” (Ley N 88- Proteccion de la Independencia Nacional y la Economia, 1999). The law 
punishes anyone who acts in support of the Helms-Burton Act and undermines the Cuban 
government. In regards to the press, the following was stated in Article 7, 
El que, con el propósito de lograr los objetivos de la Ley "Helms-Burton", el bloqueo y la 
guerra económica contra nuestro pueblo, encaminados a quebrantar el orden interno, 
desestabilizar el país y liquidar al Estado Socialista y la independencia de Cuba, colabore 
por cualquier vía con emisoras de radio o televisión, periódicos, revistas u otros medios 
de difusión extranjeros, incurre en sanción de privación de libertad de dos a cinco años o 
multa de mil a tres mil cuotas, o ambas. (Ley N 88- Proteccion de la Independencia 
Nacional y la Economia, 1999) 
 
[Translation] One who with the purpose of achieving the goals of the Helms-Burton Act, 
the embargo and the economic war against our country, aims at undermining internal 
order, destabilizing the country, and eradicating the socialist state and the Cuban 
independence, supports by any way via the radio, television, newspapers, magazines or 
any form of mass media, is punishable by law to loss of liberty from two to five years or 
a fine of a thousand to three thousand cuotas, or both.  
 
Through this law, journalists have to not only abstain from supporting U.S. policy through any 
form of media, but also abstain from doing anything that might suggest U.S. support.  
 According to Miyares (1999) Cuba is willing to show its reality by allowing foreign 
journalists into the country and by giving them the freedom to go anywhere and talk to anyone. 
Currently, there are 159 permanent accredited correspondents in Cuba from 27 different nations 
and 83 different media outlets (Prensa extranjera en Cuba, 2013). Miyares (1999) also suggests 
that in countries where mas media are privately owned, ethics and values such as respect and 
consideration are lacking and replaced by “racism, sexism, bigotry, xenophobia, child and adult 
pornography” (p. 81). He argues that in countries like Cuba in which the government sponsors 
the media, there might be restrictions against programming that goes against the principles of 
Revolution, but there is also no denigrating programing allowed. Finally, he states that Cuban 
journalists have the responsibility to defend and protect the island from those who try to 
demoralize it (Miyares, 2009; Rodriguez, 2009).  
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Mendes and Marques (2009) believe that even though the government’s main goal is to 
encourage and support the Cuban Revolution, “it has always moved towards the recognition of 
social rights” (p. 77).  
 
Methodology 
 The aim of this study is to shed light on the status of freedom of the press in Cuba from 
2002 to 2013.  The research method selected for the purposes of this study was interviews. These 
interviews aim to understand people’s perspectives on the level of freedom of the press in Cuba. 
Additionally, through one on one interviews, the researcher retrieved interviewees’ past 
experiences and gained expert insight on the situation in Cuba and on its government. Finally, 
information gathered from interviews created a record of communication that could later be 
analyzed.  
The type of interviews conducted were informant interviews. During the course of the 
study (June 2013), the researcher met with 6 people whose knowledge about Cuba and 
journalism were valuable for achieving research objectives. These informants informed the 
researcher about freedom of the press in Cuba during the past decade.  
 
Participants and Procedure 
Considering Cuban legislation regarding statements contrary to the Revolution previously 
stated, it is difficult to gain access to the opinions of Cuban people in the island concerning 
sensitive government information. Due to the lack of access to information from informants in 
the island, informants were selected from cities of high Cuban populations in the Unites States. 
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According to the 2000 U.S. Census, eight cities in the state of Florida have the largest 
Cuban population in the United States. These cities are Hialeah, Tamiami, Kendall Lakes, 
Fontainebleau, Miami, Kendall, Miami Beach and Carol City (StatJump, 2010).  Once the 
sampling units were identified based on geographical data and demographics, the snowball 
sampling strategy was employed. The sample was created through referrals from people who 
knew of others knowledgeable of journalism in Cuba. Participants were selected based on the 
fact that their experiences and professions are central to the research question.  
During the month of June of 2013, the researcher traveled to Florida to conduct formal 
interviews with Cuban exiles. There was a total of six interviewees; these included four 
journalists and writers employed by Spanish media networks in the United States located in 
Florida, one Cuban-born United States politician and one Cuban dissident living in Miami.   
Informant one was born and raised in pre-revolutionary Cuba. He worked as a television 
director in Cuba but fled the country after the revolution in 1967. He is now active in various 
television networks located in several countries in North America, Latin America and Spain such 
as Univision and Telemundo. He has worked in the mass media business for many years and has 
a successful career in the journalism field. He has received various awards throughout his career 
in Latin America and the United States. He resides in Southern Florida but has connections to 
old colleagues still in the island.   
Informant two is a radio personality in Miami, FL. He was born in post-revolutionary 
Cuba when Fidel Castro was already in power and moved to the United States in his 20s. 
Currently, he is the manager of a Spanish speaking radio station located in the city of Miami. 
The radio station includes extensive programming about current events in Cuba. The informant 
has received recognition for his professional accomplishments and is part of the Association of 
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Cuban Journalists in exile. He keeps in contact with journalists in the island and has connections 
to a variety of people in the Cuban media.   
Informant three is a recently retired Cuban journalist in the city of Miami. He is well 
known in Miami’s Cuban exile community and has received recognition for his contributions to 
the Cuban community in the United States. He has worked as the host of TV Marti’s morning 
program and has cohosted a variety of other shows within the network. He has also worked at the 
principal radio stations in Miami and as a columnist for three well recognized Spanish language 
periodicals, El Nuevo Herald, Diario Las Américas and la Revista Ideal. The informant was a 
journalist in Cuba and was incarcerated for his anti-Castro ideas. He escaped prison in 1962 and 
received political asylum in the United States in 1963. He keeps in contact with colleagues 
currently in the island.  
Informant four was the first journalist to ever interview Fidel Castro when he was hiding 
in Sierra Maestra planning revolution. He died in October 2013, three months after the interview. 
He worked as a journalist for the most popular Cuban magazine in the late fifties, Bohemia, since 
the start of his career in 1954. After seeing Fidel Castro’s failed promises of democracy, he fled 
to the United States in 1961. In Miami, he worked as the editor in chief of Radio and TV Marti 
for 20 years. He also wrote publications in exile such as the magazine Bohemia en el exilio and 
Réplica and two poem books. He worked for the Miami radio stations WQBA, WRHC, and 
WCMQ. He won the “Premio Nacional de Periodismo” in Cuba (National Award of Journalism) 
in 1959.  To this day, he is considered one of the top journalists in Cuba.  
Informant five is a Cuban-born American politician. He is the mayor of a city in Florida 
with a very high Cuban population. He is a former City Councilman. During his service, he 
worked to bring new ideas, assisted the former mayor, pointed out things that needed 
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improvement, and offered suggestions on how to improve those issues.  He had previously run 
for mayor in 2007 but lost by three votes. He ran again in 2012 and was elected. He is very 
active in his community and his goal is to run the city as a “big family.” Because of his political 
experiences and his constant contact with recent Cuban immigrants in his community, he is 
knowledgeable of the political atmosphere in the island.  
Informant six is a Cuban-born U.S. citizen who is highly concerned about social justice 
and human rights in the island. He lived in the island throughout his childhood but he and his 
parents moved to Miami to escape political oppression during his teenage years. His family 
highly opposed the regime and feared persecution from the Castro regime. The informant has 
family members who still live in the island and is constantly updated about the current events 
and changes in freedom of the press in Cuba.   
All six informants are Cuban exiles residing in Florida, U.S.A. Because of their 
geographical location, they are exposed to large amounts of U.S. media. As stated earlier, U.S. 
media about Cuba often consist of rhetoric criticizing the Cuban regime. Due to this exposure to 
U.S. Anti-Castro rhetoric through U.S. media outlets, such as TV Marti, informants might be 
biased. Their beliefs about press freedom in Cuba might be influenced by the U.S. use of media 
toward Cuba.  
The researcher selected the methodology based on her personal experiences with the 
Cuban population in the state of Florida. The researcher resided in the city of Miami from the 
year 2003 to 2010. During her time in the city of Miami, she was extensively exposed to the 
Cuban culture which allowed her to select a methodology through which she could best approach 
the Cuban informants. The methodology was therefore selected based on her understanding of 
Cuban culture for the purposes of acquiring quality data. The researcher’s past experiences with 
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the Cuban population in Florida might influence her ability as a researcher by not allowing the 
complete eradication of personal bias.  
 
Interview Questions 
The interview questions focused on the subject of freedom of speech and the press in 
Cuba and their perspectives about it. The questions aimed to find out the participants’ opinions 
on the current situation of their native country and whether or not they had noted any changes on 
press freedom since 2002. The questions asked during the interviews were open ended and did 
not impose much structure. The two main questions are:  
1. Is there Freedom of the Press in Cuba? 
2.  Have you observed any changes in the level of freedom in the past 10 years 
(2002-2013)? 
The simplicity and limited number of questions were strategically established to allow for the 
maximum amount of truthful information as they know it. The broadness of the inquiries allowed 
for the informants to dwell upon a wide range of topics and experiences without limitations.  
   
Results 
Categorization 
 In order to analyze data from interviews, responses gained from each informant were 
divided into four categories:  
1. Main characteristics of the Cuban government 
2. Topics included in media outlets 
3. Impact/Influence of the government on mass media 
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4. Overall current level of freedom of the press and changes in level of freedom from 
2002 to 2013 
 
Main characteristics of the Cuban government: Totalitarian and Authoritarian 
The two characteristics used by informants to describe the Cuban government were 
authoritarian and totalitarian. The Merriam-Webster (2014) dictionary defines authoritarian as 
“expecting or requiring people to obey rules or laws: not allowing personal freedom.” The same 
dictionary, defines totalitarian as “controlling the people of a country in a very strict way with 
complete power that cannot be opposed.” These definitions are representative of the informants’ 
definitions of these words. Although the two words have similar meanings, there is a small, yet 
important difference. Both, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes restrict freedoms; however, 
totalitarian regimes also punish those who oppose them.  
Informant five, the Cuban born U.S. politician, described the regime as authoritarian 
because of its repressive policies. He mentioned that there are a lot of rules restricting people in 
general from enjoying personal liberties such as expressing their disappointment with the 
revolution and the Castro regime. The other five informants, the four journalists and the 
dissident, described the government as totalitarian and based their description on the extreme 
repression they experienced and because of their knowledge of persecution of dissidents.  
Informant one expressed criticism against the role that law enforcement plays in the 
Cuban political oppression of dissidents. He mentioned that the Cuban police often goes 
undercover to search for dissidents in the streets and either arrest them, fine them, investigate 
them, or harass them. Informant two, also referred to the Cuban regime as totalitarian because of 
its tendency to not only restrict freedom of the press, but to also punish Cubans who hold 
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opinions that oppose the revolution. Informant three explained that to understand the Cuban 
regime, one must understand the definition of totalitarian. He stated that “a totalitarian country 
controls the totality of Cubans’ lives.” He then expanded on the idea that the Castro totalitarian 
regime has “a total lack of scruples.” He believed that since 1959 the regime’s number one goal 
is to hold complete power at all cost. Informant four stated that Cuba moved “from Batista’s 
dictatorship, to Fidel Castro’s tyranny.” He described the regime as totalitarian through his own 
experiences. He saw how innocent people were killed in streets in the name of revolution. He 
mentioned a time when he saw Fidel Castro’s troops kill everyone in a small town claiming that 
they were counter-revolutionaries. He later found out that they were simply country people 
whose animals and crops were needed by the troops so they executed them to steal their supplies. 
He also described Fidel Castro as an “evil genius” who fooled everyone by promising a 
democracy and when in power implemented a totalitarian dictatorship.  
 
Topics included in media outlets 
Each informant mentioned a variety of types programming, news, and topics in media 
outlets. Based on the types of programming, news, and topics that were mentioned, themes 
broadcasted and published in Cuba were determined. This category was divided into four 
themes: 1) Government propaganda, 2) Anti- U.S. rhetoric, 3) Cuban achievements, and 4) 
Social problems. These categories encompass the four topics mentioned during interviews. 
Reponses for this category were assigned to each sub-category based on semantic similarity. For 
example, the answers “Speeches by Fidel or Raul,” “achievements of the Revolution,” and 
“praises to Che Guevara” were included in theme one, government propaganda. Theme two: 
Anti-U.S. rhetoric, included the answers “news about the horrors of capitalism” and “criticism of  
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U.S. policy and the embargo.” Theme three: Cuban achievements, included the answers “the 
National Book fair was a success,” “growth in tourism,” and “educational and medical 
advancements.” The answers “the disgrace of independent journalists,” “the need for revival of 
civic values,” and “the need to develop revolutionary values on the youth” were included in 
theme four, social problems. It is important to note that responses on media for this component 
only included Cuban officially recognized news outlets, not independent journalists.  
 In general, according to the interviews with informants, most of the media in Cuba are 
made up of Cuban propaganda and news stories on Cuban achievements. All informants 
suggested that the media are at the service of the state. Informant three stated that with no other 
role than supporting and praising the revolution, it is no surprise that propaganda is the most 
abundant theme in all media outlets. Informant one, former director of various TV shows in 
Cuba, stated that before the revolution there was a wide variety of programming in television 
networks which were replaced by long ours of speeches by Fidel Castro after the revolution. 
Informant six expressed his resentment towards the lack of valuable dissemination of truthful 
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reporting on social problems such as the lack of food and police brutality, so that something can 
be done to solve them. Table 1 shows and overview of the four main themes in the Cuban media 
according to the informants.  
 
Impact of the revolutionary government on mass media   
 This category sought to measure the amount of control held by the government over 
media outlets. All informants responded in the same manner. All informants mentioned the fact 
that the totality of official media outlets are supported and sponsored by the government. They 
stated that all of the official mass media including newspapers, magazines, television, the radio, 
and the Internet, is controlled by the government and operates at the service of the state. They 
suggested that there is no room for criticism or opposition of the government or the Revolution 
in journalism. To ensure the absence of criticism on the media, informants stated that most heads 
of mass media outlets were hired based upon their support of the government and the Revolution 
and those who refuse to cease opposing revolutionary ideals face death or exile. Managers and 
editors in chief who are affiliated with the government monitor the work of journalists to 
eradicate all criticism or opposition. Finally, they all agreed upon the idea that the government 
uses the mass media to make Cubans believe whatever is convenient for the regime. 
Informant four, the first journalist to interview Fidel Castro before the revolution, 
explained the significant impact that the revolutionary government had on the media through his 
own experiences working for the Cuban magazine Bohemia. Bohemia was the magazine 
responsible for Fidel Castro’s popularity among the Cuban population before the revolution. 
Informant four traveled to Sierra Maestra in 1958 and lived side by side with Fidel Castro, Che 
Guevara, and their troops for a number of months to report on Castro’s plans. He was a strong 
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supporter of the revolution before it actually happened. He trusted that Fidel Castro would 
implement democracy. He stated, 
During one of my interviews with Fidel, he told me that his government would be 
democratic, that he would respect our freedom of the press and the human rights of its 
citizens; that he would hold elections within the next two years and many other promises. 
He lied. The promised democratic revolution was betrayed.  
 
During his time in Sierra Maestra, the informant witnessed events that suggested that Fidel 
Castro would become a dictator. At his return to Habana, he told the then owner and editor in 
chief of Bohemia, Miguel Angel Quevedo, about Fidel Castro’s communist doctrines and the 
many killings. He also told Quevedo that Fidel would win and become a dictator. Quevedo was 
able to publish editorials against communism and various articles criticizing the previously 
praised Fidel Castro. As foretold by our informant, Fidel Castro was victorious and because of 
his criticism, Quevedo was displaced from his position as the government named Enrique de la 
Osa the new owner and editor in chief of the magazine. Quevedo found asylum in the 
Venezuelan embassy and was later exiled to Caracas. Due to a horrible sense of guilt from 
promoting the revolution, Quevedo committed suicide in 1969 despite our informant’s attempt to 
keep him from doing so. Many journalists and employees of Bohemia, including informant four, 
were against what was happening with the press but could do nothing to prevent it so they 
abandoned the magazine and sought asylum around the world. Through this account, an example 
of a media outlet that was put under government control and the persecution of journalists who 
criticize the revolutionary government are illustrated. Informant four also mentioned that the 
government tries to “buy” journalists. He mentioned that the Cuban government offered one of 
his colleagues the director position of Radio Rebelde in exchange for support of the revolution. 
His colleague denied the offer and died in exile in Miami.  
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 Informant one had a similar account that further illustrated how the revolutionary 
government changed television programming by placing all television networks under 
government control and censoring programming. Informant one worked for Chanel 6: CMQ 
Television (Currently Cubavisión). He was initially the director of a popular show called “Casino 
de la Alegria” which showcased international celebrities that visited the island. He stressed that 
nothing was censored neither by the government or the network owner. However, on August 6th, 
1960, the Cuban government created the Cuban Telephone Company so all of the radio and 
television networks were now required to be part of the Instituto Cubano de Radiodifusion 
(Cuban Institute of Broadcasting) which later became known as the Instituto Cubano de Radio y 
Televison (Cuban Institute of Radio and Television). All of the television programing was 
displaced and replaced with Fidel Castro appearances and long hours of speeches. Self-
censorship also began to expand. Informant one mentioned a time when he wanted to talk about 
a story concerning Russian farmers who were fleeing the country during one of his shows. He 
was discouraged by his boss who stated that sensitive topics like that cannot go on air. His boss 
started censoring the material on the network because of government policies. Due to his regular 
suggestions to talk about sensitive topics on air, on May 26th, 1997, a government official came 
on set while he was working and told him “You have no place in television.” He was fired. He 
then fled the country and got asylum in the United States.  
  
Overall current level of freedom of the press and changes in level of freedom from 2002 to 2013 
This category seeks to illustrate any changes in the level of freedom over the years. To 
formulate the illustration, answers regarding persecution of independent journalists and human 
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rights advocates, hostility of the government towards dissidents, and censored material contrary 
to the revolution were included in this section.  
In answering the first question during the interviews, “Is there Freedom of the Press in 
Cuba?” every informant answered “No.” As they elaborated on their response, they all 
mentioned various incidents in which dissidents and independent journalists had been 
imprisoned, exiled, or even executed by the government. They mentioned the dangers of publicly 
opposing the government or the Revolution. Informants talked about censorship and self-
censorship of articles and news stories because of fear of losing one’s job. According to the 
informants in this study, the presence of fear to speak their minds is clear evidence of the lack of 
freedom in the country. When talking about any noted changes in the last ten years, informants 
agreed upon the fact that there have been some minor changes in policy regarding religious 
activities, increased access to the Internet, less restrictions on travel, released political prisoners 
and decreased dissident incarcerations. However, they all still believe that there have been no 
fundamental changes to increase the freedom of speech and the press in the island.  
 Informant one explained that currently there is a very low level of freedom of the press in 
Cuba, the level is not very different from how it was when he fled the island. He stated that 
censorship and self-censorship dominates every media outlet. He suggested that journalists who 
do not agree with the revolutionary regime but work for official media outlets are in constant fear 
of publishing something that the regime might consider inadequate since they can lose their jobs 
and face legal consequences. He also mentioned that even if something opposing the regime is 
written, somehow it will be censored or stopped from reaching the Cuban population. He stated 
that “freedom of the press has been nonexistent since 1960.” A change that he has noticed is an 
increase in the amount of independent journalists, but he stressed the fact that this is not a change 
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caused by the government but rather a change caused by the Cuban society. When talking about 
independent journalists, informant one referred to them as brave people who are widely admired 
by the population. He mentioned that these independent journalists face many dangers since they 
are opposing the regime and going against the law. According to him, independent journalists are 
harassed, assaulted, and their children are not allowed to go to school. He finished by stating that 
“They [the Cuban government] are so weak, that they can’t allow the truth.”  
 Informant two, like informant one, stated that “there is no freedom of the press at all.” He 
said that all media outlets need to be at the service of the political system. He mentioned one 
exception that is excluded from censorship which are Catholic articles. He clarified that these 
religious publications are not officially accepted by the regime but are somehow tolerated under 
a lot of government pressure. He also mentioned that recently, minimal changes have been 
implemented within the country but always with some government control. One example is the 
recent access to the Internet through internet cafes. He clarified that internet use comes with a 
catch since it is extremely expensive and supervised. He stated that Cubans make about $15.00 
U.S. dollars a week and Internet cafes usually cost about $5.00 U.S. dollars per hour. He added 
that e-mails can be received from other countries but that pictures are never allowed to come 
through. He talked extensively about independent journalists since this is how he gets truthful 
information from the island for his radio broadcasts. He explained that independent journalists 
are highly persecuted and suffer due to unfair incarceration. Independent journalists cannot 
disseminate their reports inside the island so the info gets leaked out of the country and 
disseminated in other parts of the world.  
 Informant three also believes that there is a lack of freedom of the press in the island. 
When he talked about changes in recent years, he refers to them as fake liberties implemented at 
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specific moments in time for the convenience of the Cuban regime. He explains that small 
changes makes it look like Cubans have more freedom which is not accurate. For example, he 
mentioned the recent opening of cyber cafes. The Cuban government is trying to make the world 
believe that Cubans now have the freedom to access the World Wide Web when in reality, it is 
so expensive to utilize the internet that barely anyone can access it. Additionally, those who can 
access it are supervised. He stated that “There have not been any changes in basic Cuban laws 
and everything is still the same.”   
Informant four explained censorship from his own experience and strongly believes that 
journalists today experience censorship like he did. During his interviews with Fidel Castro, 
Castro would check the informant’s notes and erase what he could not publish. Before publishing 
articles, Castro would also ask our informant to show him the article to make changes. The 
informant mentioned that sometimes, his articles were reduced by more than 50% on the 
information he had compiled. The informant fears that in today’s Cuba, unfortunately the same 
occurs. Editors in chief and government officials censor articles with information that is not 
convenient for them and often make significant edits to journalists’ works eradicating the 
essence of the original piece. Informant four believes that changes in media in the last ten years 
such as limited access to the internet and less restrictions on travel are all “cosmetic changes” 
rather than “fundamental changes.” He believes that fundamental changes are needed for 
freedom of the press to actually exist in the island once again. He expressed a lot of admiration 
for independent journalists who fight against oppression despite fear. Informant four himself 
feared for his life and his wife’s life if he ever returned to the island because of all the criticism 
he has published toward the Cuban revolutionary government.  
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  Informant five believes that Cuba is slowly advancing towards a more free press. He 
admits that there are still many rules and regulations but stated that if people continue fighting 
for what they want, they will see a free Cuba. He mentioned that the number of political 
prisoners has decreased over the past few years, and that people are less fearful to oppose the 
regime.  
 Informant six believes that there is still a very low level of freedom of the press in Cuba. 
He explains that all media outlets are still owned by the government and can therefore be 
censored and controlled. He stated that there is no dissemination of information within the island 
and that he knows people who know more about Cuba when they move out of the island than 
when they actually lived in it. He explained that there is a little more freedom of religion. He also 
stressed the fact that technology has helped independent journalists since they can now record 
whatever the government is doing, such as police officers physically assaulting an activist, and 
leak it to other countries to expose the government and demand change. According to him, this 
process of exposing the government is highly dangerous since independent journalists are being 
incarcerated, tortured and even killed by the regime. He also mentioned that the government 
sends people disguised as civilians to harm protestant, activists or dissidents. For example, he 
knew a rapper who would scream out his criticism towards the revolutionary government in the 
streets. A few weeks after, he found his house destroyed. Another example is harassment toward 
the Ladies in White which is a group of women who have relatives incarcerated as political 
prisoners and lead peaceful protests every Sunday. He knows of women who are pushed around, 
physically assaulted, or get their property damaged.  
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Discussion 
This study sought to determine the level of freedom of the press in Cuba from the year 
2002 to the year 2013 and to identify any changes in the level of freedom in that same timeline.  
Overall, based on the interviews of six Cuban exiles who are currently residing in the 
United States, there are concerns over the lack of freedom of the press in Cuba. Informants 
seemed to suggest that freedom with limitations is not freedom. Additionally, it was discovered 
that according to the informants there have been minor changes to allow more freedom but no 
fundamental reforms have been established. Based on their testimonies, the data suggest that 
most Cubans in this study consider their regime to be totalitarian. They believe that the Cuban 
government strictly controls the media, and that the majority of the media in Cuba is made up of 
propaganda and stories on Cuban success.  
 Based on the results of this study, the Cuban press can be described through Wilber 
Schramm’s (1956) Soviet Communist Theory of the Press often referred to as the Communist 
Theory of the Press. Schramm was the director of the Institute for Communication Research in 
Stanford University and wrote about the press from a communist perspective. This theory stems 
from the society of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin in which the press is owned and controlled by the 
government and has the sole purpose of advancing the government’s objectives with no room for 
criticism or opposition.   
 On various occasions, Fidel Castro has expressed his admiration for Marx and Lenin and 
has admitted that he based his decisions on how to run Cuba on their principles. For example, 
during a speech in 1961 Fidel Castro stated “somos marxista-leninistas… seremos siempre 
marxista-leninistas” [Translation] “We are Maxist-Leninsts… we will always be Marxist-
Leninsts” (Castro, 1961, para. 42). Schramm (1956) points out three basic characteristics of the 
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communist press which are state ownership, censorship, and propaganda (p. 105). Based on the 
informants’ responses, these three characteristics are prominent in the Cuban press. Freedom of 
expression is also mentioned in the theory. Schramm mentions that in a communist government, 
people can exercise their freedoms of speech and the press within the limitations of its 
government. As stated earlier, the Cuban government grants these freedoms in its Constitution as 
long as these rights are exercised in accordance to the revolution.  
 
Ownership 
All Cuban media are owned and controlled by the government and its institutions. 
According to Schramm’s Soviet Theory of the Press, the government needs to control all mass 
media facilities in order to be able to control the dissemination of information. As previously 
stated in this study, the Cuban government has several institutions in place to control and 
regulate all mass media facilities including the presses, the paper, and the broadcasting stations. 
Another part of Schramm’s theory, is the belief that the government knows what is good for 
society and must therefore do what is best for them. The Cuban government believes that a way 
to avoid social unrest is to control the information in the media. Finally, communist governments 
own the media for the purpose of guaranteeing equal access to the media by eliminating a class-
dominated press. As previously stated, the Cuban regime is a strong opposer of imperialism and 
owning the media allows for class equality in the press.  
 
Censorship 
 Schramm states that under the communist press “attacks against leadership are equivalent 
to treason against the state” (1956, p. 117). Basically, no opposition against the government is 
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allowed through the mass media and opposition is punishable by law. Based on this study, this 
component of the theory applies to the Cuban media. Policies and laws are in place against any 
counter-revolutionary comments in the media. Independent journalists are persecuted and articles 
criticizing the revolutionary government are censored. Censorship leads to repetitiveness in the 
news which is viewed as a strength, not a weakness.  
 Schramm explains that in a communist society, the government has the purpose to create 
unity within the nation. The only way to achieve this, is to get all citizens under the same 
mindset. To create and maintain national unity, communist governments censor disrupting 
publications and keep opposing views from foreign publications and broadcasts outside of the 
country. The Cuban regime seeks to create and maintain national unity by creating a positive 
view of the revolution. To achieve this, the government does not allow publications with 
divergent views to reach the Cuban population.  
 Self-censorship is also examined by the Communist Theory of the Press. According to 
Shramm (1956), “Freedom and responsibility are inseparably linked in the Soviet theory” (p. 
129). He expands on the idea that the government gives the responsibility of creating a positive 
image of the country to journalists. In Cuba, journalists self-censor their works based on the 
responsibility given to them by the Cuban regime to create a positive image of the island to the 
world. The government claims that there are a lot of negative misconceptions about the island 




 Lenin stated that the media has three main roles to play which are “collective 
propagandist, collective agitator… collective organizer” (as cited in Schramm, 1956, p.116). 
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Based on these three roles, the media serves as instruments of the government to get people to 
support their ideals. Schramm mentions the instrumentality of the media used by the government 
to advance their power. The media therefore serve the purpose of not only informing the masses 
about the government, but also, to convince the people of the greatness of the government. In 
Cuba, the government controlled media broadcasts long hours of speeches by Fidel Castro and 
have daily publications praising the revolution. This type of Cuban propaganda is meant to build 
support toward the revolution. Cuban media aims to shape the way Cubans see their world, their 
country, and more specifically, their government. Through propaganda, the Cuban government 
aims to benefit by not only gaining popularity but also by gaining approval. 
Even though these findings yield interesting conclusions, they are not definite and cannot 
be generalized since the sample was not representative of the larger population they were drawn 
from. Additionally, confirmation bias of informants cannot be eradicated. Due to their 
geographical location, they do not have direct contact with Cuban journalism or the Cuban 
government since they no longer live or exercise their profession in the island. Their knowledge 
on the current state of freedom of the press comes from sources within the island, not from 
personal recent experiences. Based on their demographics, informants’ experiences took place 
many years ago and the situation might not necessarily be the same in today’s Cuba.  
 
Conclusion 
Further research is needed to expand the knowledge on the levels of freedom of speech 
and the press in Cuba. There is a great lack of current literature on the issue and the public’s 
perceptions on Cuba needs to be yielded by scholarly literature and not by U.S. rhetoric. As 
technology quickly develops and more reforms are introduced to the island, wider opportunities 
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for research in Cuba might increase. Looking at blogs, social media and the internet might be 
important considerations for future studies.  
Based on the study, results reached through the literature review and the interviews of 
Cuban journalists, this study concludes that there seems to be a limited amount of freedom of the 
press in Cuba from 2002 to 2013. Additionally, it is concluded that little change in regard to 
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